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Abstract 
It is now recognised that Health IT systems can bring benefits 
to healthcare, but they can also introduce new causes of risks 
that contribute to patient harm. This paper focuses on 
approaches to modelling and analysing potential causes of 
medication errors, particularly those arising from the use of 
Electronic Prescribing. It sets out a systematic way of analysing 
hazards, their causes and consequences, drawing on the 
expertise of a multidisciplinary team. The analysis results are 
used to support the development of a safety case for a large-
scale Health IT system in use in three teaching hospitals. The 
paper shows how elements of the safety case can be updated 
dynamically. We show that it is valuable to use the dynamically 
updated elements to inform clinicians about changes in risk, 
and thus prompt changes in practice to mitigate the risks.   
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Introduction 
Many countries have promoted Health Information Technology 
(HIT) as a primary means to improve the safety and efficiency 
of healthcare delivery. For example, the US government and 
European Commission have initiated policies to promote the 
adoption and use of HIT [1]. In the UK, several funding 
programmes have been launched to drive technology use within 
the National Health Service (NHS) [2]. One of the main types 
of HIT being targeted is Electronic Prescribing Systems (EPS) 
that involve “the use of computing devices to enter, modify, 
review, and output or communicate, drug prescriptions” [3].  
There are many potential benefits associated with EPS, e.g. 
reduction in prescription errors as a result of fewer illegible 
orders, easier repeat prescriptions and better ability to track 
prescriptions [4]. However, the introduction of EPS also 
introduces new causes of risks, for example alert fatigue [5]. In 
order to realise the benefits of EPS, thorough risk assessment 
must be conducted. This should enable hospitals to evaluate 
whether the EPS will achieve safer care by reducing current 
clinical risk and also controlling the new risks associated with 
the introduction of the new technology.  
In many engineering domains the use of a Safety Case (SC) is 
an established practice [6]. A SC is a structured argument, 
supported by evidence, that a system is acceptably safe in its 
context of use [7]. The SC is a risk management tool, providing 
rationale for accepting a system into service and enabling the 
relevant stakeholders to make informed decisions. The SC is 
particularly useful when it is produced at the same time as the 
system is designed and deployed, as it can help to inform design 
decisions and potential changes to the clinical workflows [8].  
Previously, we reviewed the notion of hazard for HIT [9] and 
implemented a tool-supported methdology called the Safety 
Modelling, Assurance and Reporting Toolset (SMART) [10]. 
In this context, hazards are conditions or behaviour that can be 
observed at the level of the clinical system, and which have a 
clear link to patient harm, e.g. wrong medication. In this paper, 
we use SMART to support hazard analysis and develop a SC 
for an EPS deployed in three teaching hospitals. This paper 
focuses on three areas: 
• Safety analysis: modelling causes and consequences of 
hazards, and hazard controls; 
• Safety case: the use of the Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) [11] to present a safety argument, reflecting the 
hazard controls and risk acceptance; 
• Through-life safety: an initial analysis of those aspects 
of the SC that are static, and those which can benefit 
from being updated dynamically. 
Our approach involves proactive safety analysis, prior to 
deployment of EPS. In addition, we present a rationale for 
dynamically updating the SC, to support through-life safety. 
We refer to this as a Dynamic Safety Case (DSC) [12].  
Methods 
Setting: The study was undertaken in three teaching hospitals 
based on a large-scale HIT system, with a focus on the 
prescribing process as part of medication management. Figure 
1 is an abstract model of the medication management process, 
of which prescribing is the first step, and the scope of our study.  
 
Figure 1 – Abstract Model of Medication Management 
Data collection: a qualititve reseach method is used in this 
study. Data was collected from multi-disciplinary workshops 
(eight in total), which were organised to perform the hazard 
identification and risk analysis for the EPS. There were 3 
clinical consultants, 2 nurses, 2 pharmacists, 2 safety engineers, 
2 researchers and 2 systems engineers (representing the EPS 
supplier) involved in the workshops. 
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Data analysis: A combination of Software Hazard Analysis 
and Resolution in Design (SHARD) [13] and Systems 
Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) [14] were 
used to stimulate the indentification of hazards, their causes and 
consequences, and the controls associated with the hazards. 
SHARD is suitable for identifying hazards and casuses of 
hazards from a software perspective, e.g. missing data, but it 
does not address complex interactions between software 
systems and humans. SEIPS provides a framework for a 
comprehensive consideration of work system design, which 
includes five elements: person, tasks, technology and tools, 
environment and organisation, and its impact on care processes 
and outcomes. This helps to address the interactions of software 
system and humans in a complex socio-technical context. Thus 
the two methods are complementary. The results of using 
SHARD and SEIPS are recorded using bow-tie diagrams. 
Finally, GSN was used to represent the safety arguments for 
EPS based on the results and findings from the workshops. 
Results 
Six main findings were identified, which are reported in this 
section. 
The importance of a clear process model 
To ensure the safe implementation of HIT systems, it is 
important to understand how HIT systems are used to support 
the clinical activities. As such, the first step was to define a clear 
process model to reflect the relationships between EPS, as a 
HIT system, and prescribing, as a clinical activity. During this 
task, one challenge arose, which is to what level of granularity 
the prescribing process should be modelled, e.g. a more detailed 
IT centered view, including “right click for more medication 
options”, or a more abstract clinical activity level, such as 
“choose right medication”. As a result of considering both the 
validitiy of the processes and the emphasis on clinical context 
for hazard identification, the multidisciplinary team constructed 
the clinical process model to describe the flow of clinical 
activities and decisions, linked to the specific functions in the 
EPS, as shown in Figure 2. This also reflects well established 
health informatics approaches to evaluating HIT systems, that 
HIT interventions should be clinically- and problem-driven 
rather than technology-driven [15]. As is shown in Figure 2, the 
“sign” clinical activity in this model is associated with the “sign 
medication” function in the EPS. This model provides an 
understanding of the interaction between a HIT system and its 
clinical activities which is necessary before being able to 
identify hazards. 
Identifying hazards in complex clincal settings 
The most critical step in achieving and demonstrating the safety 
of HIT systems is to conduct a systematic process to identify 
potential hazards during the product development and then 
engineer them out or reduce their likelihood [16]. In order to 
carry out a thorough and proactive hazard identification, we 
first agreed on an overall hazard categorization based on the 
five rights in medication safety [17], producing five general 
categories: 
1. Wrong patient selected in prescribing phase 
2. Wrong medication dose prescribed  
3. Wrong medication route prescribed  
4. Wrong medication time prescribed 
5. Wrong medication choice 
Each hazard category can be refined further. We do this using 
the failure classes defined in SHARD, which provides a 
structured approach to the identification of potentially 
hazardous behaviour in software systems. By applying these 
failure classes (omission, commission, early, late and incorrect) 
to the hazard category 5 - wrong medication choice, defined 
above, we identified seven specific hazard cases, loss of 
prescription, unintended medication, wrong medication, late 
medication, early medication, duplicate medication and 
adverse interaction.  
For brevity, the rest of the paper focuses on the wrong 
medication choice category, but the method described above 
would apply equally well to the other hazard categories. 
 
 
Fgure 2- Prescribing Process in SMART
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Modelling the causal chains (technical and non technical) 
 
Figure 3 – Bow-Tie for Wrong Medication 
In order to mitigate the hazards, it is important to identify their 
causes so we can identify effective controls. In a socio-technical 
system, it is important to recognise both technical and non -
technical factors. Therefore, we used the SEIPS model to guide 
us to think systematically. The use of the SEIPS model both 
helps to identify causes of the specific hazard, and the controls. 
For each hazard, there are a range of controls that can 
counteract causes of the hazards, and others that can influence 
the consequence of the hazards. Figure 3 illustrates the causes 
and consequences and the controls related to the Wrong 
Medication hazard, arising out of the analysis workshops. 
In Figure 3, we can see that there are 8 identified causes that 
contribute to Wrong Medication during prescribing (the left-
hand side of the bow-tie). Among them, three causes belong to 
the technology factor (technology and tools in SEIPS), which 
is related to the EPS deployed in the hospital. A well designed 
EPS should have the ability to mitigate the causal factors, for 
example by integrating Tall Man Letter to make it noticeable or 
striking out inapplicable options when the prescribers are 
selecting medications. Another three causes are categorised as 
human factors (person in SEIPS). These causes can be 
controlled by providing education and training to clinical 
practitioners. The last two causes are work environment factors 
(environment in SEIPS). They are related to the local 
organisation and policy. These factors should be controlled by 
providing guidance or procedures by the local organisation, e.g. 
to close the ward at key times.  
The classification of causal factors is useful, as recognising that 
different causal factors belong to particular categories helps to 
find the right control. It also helps to make the causes of hazards 
explicit and reveal the weak points of the system. For example, 
considering Wrong Medication, it seems that the organisation 
should also seek to reduce the pressure on clinical practitioners, 
e.g. by reducing the un-necessary and non-clinical related 
workload (environmental factor). 
Difficulty of determining severity 
Turning to the right-hand side of the bow-tie, we consider the 
consequences of the hazards. In the workshops, we found it 
very challenging to assess the potential harm concerning a par-
ticular hazard. For example, consider the Wrong Medication 
hazard; the medication type, the profile of the patients, the com-
plexity of the clinical conditions and the state of the clinical 
setting would lead to different consequences. 
In addition, we found it difficult to map the consequence of 
medication errors to severity of harm. From our literature re-
view, we discovered that it is very hard to find information to 
make such connections. Studies such as [18] and [19] either just 
give a severity classification without a detailed description of 
how they mapped their patient results to the severity, or they 
focus on error types and their causes, but do not identify the 
severity of the patient outcome. Further work is needed on how 
to categorise the severity of harm and give concrete examples 
how to map the consequences (patient outcomes) to different 
severities.  In order to illustrate this, we present examples of 
patient harm in Table 1 using the World Health Organization 
(WHO) severity classification [20]. This table is intended to be 
illustrative but refining and expanding it, e.g. by considering 
different aspects of human function such as vision and respira-
tion, might aid in future hazard and risk assessment.  
Clear arguments, the essense of reasoning 
Based on insights gained in the workshops, we employed GSN 
to represent the  safety argument for the EPS in three teaching 
hospitals. Figure 4 shows the top level of the safety argument 
and reflects the use of a Hazard Log to record information about 
all the hazards. A Hazard Log is a standard safety management 
tool for recording and tracking information about risks, used in 
other sectors, e.g. aerospace, but also applicable in healthcare 
and required by the NHS HIT standards [7; 21].  
Table 1– Examples of Severity Classes 
Severity None Mild Moderate Severe Fatal 





Harm or loss of 





long-term harm or 
permanent loss of 
function
Death caused or 
brought forward by 
the incident 
Examples Paracetamol given 
instead of priadel 
(loss of therapeu-
tic effect)  
 
Use of antibiotics 
to treat viral in-
fections (NB re-
duces utility of 
antibiotics) 
 
Nausea, vomiting or 
diarrhoea from over-
dose of epirubicin 
 
Forgetting to specify 
maximum daily dos-




due to prescribing di-
azepam not diltiazem 
Digestive problems 
including ulcers and 
internal bleeding 
 









Blindness due to 
prescribing a diu-
retic to patients with 
low blood pressure 
 
Lung damage and 
possible sepsis giv-
ing oral treatment to 
patient with dyspha-
gia 








incorrect use of 
warfarin 
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Figure 4 – Top level of the GSN for the EPS for the three Teaching Hospitals
It is often infeasible to eliminate risks, so the claim Residual 
Risks shows that the risks left after implementing the controls 
are acceptable and/or managed in the context of the Risk Matrix 
used at the hospitals; this breaks down into two sub-cases: 
• Residual risks meet the acceptability criteria 
• Residual risks do not meet the criteria, but can be 
accepted due to the clinical benefit 
Evidence to support these claims can come directly from the 
Hazard Log. 
For example, the risk of the “Wrong Medication” hazard has 
been reduced to an acceptable level, given the seven controls 
identified in Figure 3. The controls and risks are set out in the 
Hazard Log. Alternatively, we could have expanded the GSN 
argument further, replacing solution HL1 with more detailed 
sub-arguments for each hazard. For the “Wrong Medication” 
hazard, the solutions at the bottom of the argument would be 
evidence about the effectiveness of each of the controls.  
The evidence about the controls on the left of the bow-tie is 
generated from analysis of the error records, which are derived 
from chart review, automated review of electronic records, 
review of incident reports, review of self-reporting, patient and 
staff interviews, and from direct observation [22]. For example, 
in order to assess whether the controls – Tall Man letters and 
Formulary filters – are effective, we should interrogate the error 
rates related to mis-selection of medication and free text. 
Dynamic Safety Cases 
It is well established that the safety of critical services is a 
dynamic property [23]. In healthcare, this dynamism is often 
attributed to variation in the health and care services, and their 
underlying systems, as well as in the environments within 
which they are deployed. Although variation can be seen as a 
negative attribute, e.g. a sign of noncompliance, increasingly 
more emphasis is placed on the necessity of variation to enable, 
and sometimes empower, people and technologies to adjust and 
adapt to ensure continuous safe care. The ability to adapt and 
adjust is a key enabler for resilience in healthcare [24]. Unlike 
traditional SC, which often remain static and are only updated 
in a reactive manner, both the justification and evidence base of 
the SC for a complex process such as prescribing should evolve 
based on real-time data that is collected, proactively, from 
diverse sources, particularly covering and combining clinical, 
organisational and technological factors.  
The SC described in this paper will be extended and integrated 
with a new dynamic risk model and uncertainty assessment 
algorithms, based on Bayesian Networks, for proactively 
computing the confidence in, and updating the reasoning about, 
the safety of the medication services based on real-time data. 
This will be combined with a set of update rules triggering the 
provision of actionable suggestions to clinicians in response to 
changes in the services, clinical settings, the safety argument or 
the confidence in that argument. Thus clinicians will be able to 
take risk reduction action, i.e. adding new controls, based on 
leading indicators/precursors of problems before they develop 
into potential errors and patient harm.  
Discussion 
The paper summarises our work to date on developing a full SC 
for the entire HIT system in the three hospitals. Our results so 
far show that having a clear model of the medication process 
aids analysis, both in identifying hazards and their controls. In 
particular the clincal process models enable the workflows to 
be analysed at a level which is understandable by the users of 
the EPS, and which is also clinically meaningful.  
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The use of the bow-tie to model the causes and consequences 
of a hazard in the precribing process gives a direct visuliation 
of how a hazard is controlled, what can be the potential causes 
of this particular hazard, what consequences there can be for the 
patient through this hazard and what kind of controls we have 
to mitigate the hazard. This is a very useful basis for hazard and 
risk assessment. We see an opportunity to use this approach to 
improve analysis of medication safety, particularly assessment 
of risk, beyond just EPS, and this is an area for future research.  
Further, we have shown how to use GSN to construct an explicit 
argument to justify the safety of EPS use in the context of the 
wider medication management system. The SC rests on 
evidence, some of which relates to the controls identified in the 
bow-tie diagram. SC are predictive, and the evidence is usually 
based on analysis prior to operation. A first step in making the 
SC representative of actual use of EPS would be to update the 
evidence to reflect the effectiveness of the controls, as they 
change over time. Ideally we would use this to show that the 
EPS plus controls is better (in terms of patient safety) than the 
previous manual system. However it is hard to obtain data that 
shows what happened before introduction of EPS, and hence to 
make such comparisons. In contrast, in future, it will be 
possible to  see whether or not the controls are effective and the 
extent to which the risk is reducing over time, e.g. the frequency 
of over-riding alerts and error rates relating to mis-selection and 
free text are going down. Thus the SC can support management 
of risk through life, rather than just being a tool for deciding 
whether or not a system can be deployed. This is a key area of 
our future work, and should lead to development of DSC. 
Conclusions 
Management of risk associated with HIT systems is challenging 
as the technology is used in a complex socio-technical setting, 
and the staff using the systems are often under significant 
pressure, due to the volume of work, or the need to respond to 
patients’ symptoms very quickly. We have presented our 
approach to assessing the safety of HIT systems, based on work 
on EPS in three UK hospitals, which draws on accepted 
practices in other domains, which we believe helps address the 
problems of managing safety in a healthcare setting. 
The work enables causes and consequences of hazards to be 
analysed more directly than is possible with a purely statistical 
approach. Further, it enables the role and effectiveness of risk 
controls to be assessed. The work reported here is part of an 
ongoing research programme that will enable dynamic control 
over safety risk, by updating the evidence in the SC from 
analysis of operational data.  
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